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THE INS AND OUTS OF FEDERAL COURT:
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO REMOVAL AND REMAND
Sidney Powell*
Deborah Pearce-Reggio * *
I. INTRODUCTION
'Tis a litigious day and age in which we live. Thus must the discerning practi-
tioner decide whether to proceed in state court, if it be the more favorable forum,
or to move to federal court, if the law and circumstances so allow. Title 28, §§
1441-1448 pave the way for excursions between the courts, though a trip to one
court does not guarantee that it will be the final destination. A party choosing to
file in state court often finds itself whisked into federal court, and a party prefer-
ring the federal forum frequently finds itself redirected to state court. The practi-
tioner must navigate between the courts with great care. The road from state
court to federal court is fraught with potholes, and the road back to state court
can be bumpy and costly, to say the least.
It is in this vein that this Article attempts to roadmap the paths between state
and federal court. Part II discusses the authorities and practicalities guiding
removal from state to federal court. Part III plots the procedural course for a
successful removal. Part IV charts the way back for remand to state court.
Finally, Part V surveys appellate review of the excursions between state and fed-
eral court.
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS GUIDING REMOVAL
Section 1441 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides the basis for
removal jurisdiction:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending....'
In essence, § 1441(a) provides that a case may be removed from state to federal
court only when it could have been brought in federal court in the first place.
Thus, with the exception of specific statutory mandates and prohibitions, the
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1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
2. Cervantes v. Bexar County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 99 E3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1996).
3. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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test for determining removal jurisdiction is the same as that applied for determin-
ing original federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Paragraph (b) of § 1441
confirms this, stating the following:
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction found-
ed on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence
of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the par-
ties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State
in which such action is brought.4
Section 1441 (a) further provides that only defendants may remove a case from
state to federal court. That is, "the right to remove a case from state to federal
court is vested exclusively in the defendant."' Before embarking on this process,
however, the prudent defendant should examine several practical considerations.
While fear of local prejudice and the notion that state judges are not competent
6.*
to adjudicate federal questions originally drove defendants to remove cases, in
modern times, removal is driven more by practical and strategic concerns.
Defendants should thus assess such things as jury verdicts, trial rules and proce-
dure, and the availability, caseload, and personality of federal judges in making
the decision of whether to remove a case to federal court. In particular, a defen-
dant carefully should consider the following:
1. With regard to juries, the geographic scope of the jury pools, the number of
jurors required to reach a verdict, and the rules governing jury demand in each
forum;
2. With regard to procedure, familiarity with the respective procedural rules, the
time frame and production requirements of each court, each court's general
treatment of motion practice, and the various disclosure and discovery rules;
and
3. With regard to judges, the case load of each judge, his or her general degree
of familiarity with files, the manner in which the judge took the bench, i.e., by
election or appointment, and the methods by which the judge may be removed
from the case.
In short, before invoking the federal jurisdiction, the defendant should consider
whether removal is in his best interest. Of course, the plaintiff will likely have
considered the same basic factors and, given the plaintiff's choice of the state
forum, the defendant may very well find that the federal forum better advances
his concerns. Assuming this to be the case, however, the defendant must move
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994).
5. DAVID HITrNER ET AL., RUTTER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL - 5TH
CIR. ED. 2:615 (1994) ("[The] plaintiff who has chosen to commence the action in state court cannot later
remove to federal court.").
6. Id. at 2:597.
7. Id. at 2:576-87.1.
[VOL. 17:227
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO REMOVAL AND REMAND
swiftly and with great care. Delayed or misguided steps along the removal path
may jeopardize the defendant's chances of having his case heard in federal court.
III. THE REMOVAL ROADMAP
Five basic considerations govern the proper removal of a case from state to
federal court: who, what, where, when, and how. "Who" determines which
party may remove a case to federal court, and "what" dictates which sorts of
cases may be removed. "Where" governs the place to which the case may be
removed, while "when" governs the timing of that removal. Finally, "how" regu-
lates the method by which a case may be removed. Each of these considerations
is addressed below. Before expounding upon them, however, two basic tenets of
removal jurisdiction should be recognized: first, removal statutes are strictly
construed, and all doubts regarding removability are resolved in favor of remand
to state court. 8 Second, the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction rests with
the party seeking removal, and this burden applies both to establishing federal
jurisdiction and to following the appropriate procedures for removal. 9
A. "Who" May Remove a Case from State to Federal Court?
As stated, only defendants may remove a case from state to federal court.10
This rule is not as simple as it sounds, however. In cases involving multiple
defendants, all defendants properly joined and served in the action must join in
the notice of removal." This general rule triggers several corollary rules. First,
if a properly joined defendant who has been served with notice of the state action
refuses to join in the notice of removal, the case may not be removed.12 Second,
a defendant who has not been served by the plaintiff in the state action need not
join in the notice of removal. 13 Finally, federal law determines which parties are
"defendants" for removal purposes, and simply because a party is aligned as a
defendant by the plaintiff does not mean that the court will treat him as a defen-
dant for removal purposes. 14 Instead, federal courts apply a functional test of
party status, assessing which parties are attempting to achieve a particular result
and which parties are resisting that effort. It is on this basis that the "plaintiffs"and the "defendants" are aligned.
8. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
9. Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 E3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995); Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental
S.S. Co., 287 E2d 252, 253-54 (5th Cir. 1961).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
11. Smilgrin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 854 E Supp. 464 (S.D. Tex. 1994). All defendants must concur in
removal and file their notice of removal within thirty days from when the first defendant was served with state
court process. A defendant who does not initially join in the removal may do so, but only if done within the
thirty days allotted for removal. Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1263 (5th Cir.
1988). But see Doe v. Kerwood, 969 F.2d 165, 169 n.15 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting exceptions to rule may be rec-
ognized based on equitable concerns and on a case-by-case basis). See also McKinney v. Board of Trustees,
955 F.2d 924, 927 (4th Cir. 1992) (allowing each defendant thirty days from time of service).
12. Doe, 969 E2d at 167; Acme Brick Co. v. Agrupacion Exportadora de Maquinaria Ceramica, 855 E
Supp. 163 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
13. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939); Wesley v. Mississippi Transp. Comm'n, 857 E Supp. 523
(S.D. Miss. 1994).
14. Chicago v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
15. OPNAD Fund, Inc. v. Watson, 863 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
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A few other principles guide the courts in analyzing "defendants" for removal
purposes. When faced with the removal of separate and independent claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), the courts consider only those defendants implicated
by the removed claims in assessing removal jurisdiction. 16 Similarly, the presence
of certain defendants is disregarded by federal courts in reviewing removal juris-
diction, such as defendants only nominally or formally joined,17 defendants
fraudulently joined,18 and defendants whose identities are unknown." Finally,
federal circuit courts are split on whether a third-party defendant may remove a
case from state to federal court. While the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held
that a third-party defendant may remove a case (assuming federal jurisdiction
exists) 2° other circuits have refused to allow third-party defendants to remove
21
cases where the original defendants have refused to do so. In almost any cir-
cuit, moreover, it would appear that the "third-party defendant" seeking to
remove must be joined actually and properly in the action before removal may
occur. At least one court has held that removal by an alleged third-party defen-
dant was defective because, at the time of the removal, the party seeking to join
the third-party defendant had not yet received court permission to join him as a
party. Absent such permission, the third-party defendant had no right to remove
the case, as it could not appear voluntarily to do so and could not be forced to
22
appear involuntarily in order to take that action.
Finally, because the power of removal is vested exclusively in the defendant, a
plaintiff may not remove its own case to federal court after it has filed suit in
state court. This is true even if the defendant asserts a counter-claim against the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff believes that the counter-claim triggers federal jurisdic-
tion.23 At least one circuit has noted a quasi-exception to this rule, however,
holding that in arbitration enforcement proceedings, the first party to invoke
court assistance is deemed the plaintiff for removal purposes. Thus, the oppos-
ing party is deemed the defendant and may seek removal of the state case, and it
is immaterial that this party may actually have been the party to initiate the arbi-
24tration proceedings.
16. Acme Brick Co., 855 E Supp. at 165.
17. Tri-Cities Newspapers, Inc. v. Tri-Cities Printing Pressman Local 349, 427 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir.
1970). Cf Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 883 E Supp. 1529 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (insurance
broker not merely nominal party where plaintiff could assert claim against insurance broker and his company
for damage to property).
18. See Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1992); Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of
Trustees, 925 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1991); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 E2d 545 (5th Cir. 1981).
19. Farias, 925 F.2d at 871. Cf Tompkins v. Lowe's Home Ctr., Inc., 847 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La. 1994) (suit
naming diverse employer and fictitious employee remanded for lack of complete diversity when it was discov-
ered that employee was domiciled in same state as plaintiff, only one employee was implicated in plaintiff's
action, and employee's citizenship was established at commencement of action).
20. In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1255, 1259 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Carl Heck Engineers, Inc. v.
La Fourche Parish Police Jury, 622 E2d 133, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1980).
21. See, e.g., Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 E2d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d
478, 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
22. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 E Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995). The Texas court also held that the third-
party's right to remove did not run from receipt of a courtesy copy of the petition prior to that court's grant of
leave to file the third-party complaint. Id. at 1343.
23. See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 33 U.S. 100 (1941); Ballards' Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Transue,
865 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1989).
24. Oppenheimer & Co. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit does not appear to
have addressed this quasi-exception.
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B. "What" Types of Cases May Be Removed?
The bulk of reported cases dealing with removal issues address whether federal
jurisdiction exists in the first place. Because federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction,25 the removed case must be one which, at the time of the removal,•• 26
could have been brought in federal court initially. There are several bases upon
which a court may rest federal removal jurisdiction. The first two - and the pri-
mary two - are diversity and federal question jurisdiction.27 Governed by 28
U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction exists when:
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between -
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state.., as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
Federal question jurisdiction exists over "all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.",29 There are, however, several
special statutes that also confer federal jurisdiction for removal purposes. These
statutes concur the following: claims against federal officers and members of the
armed forces, certain civil rights claims, foreclosure actions against the United
States, removal of actions by the Resolution Trust Corporation and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, claims related to bankruptcy cases, cases con-
cerning federal regulation of international and foreign banking, arbitration agree-
ments or awards falling under the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, actions involving the International
Monetary Fund or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
actions in which the postal service is a party, and actions against foreign states.30
Similarly, several special statutes prohibit the removal of certain types of claims.
Among these are as follows: state court actions based on the Securities Act of
1933, state court actions against a railroad arising under the Federal Employers'
25. Coury v. Prot, 85 E3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996).
26. Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 99 E3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1996).
27. See, e.g., Robert F. Daley, Jr., Basic Removal Practice and Procedure, 6 S.C. LAw. 25 (1995) (two basic
grounds for removal are federal question and diversity jurisdiction).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994). Other diversity jurisdiction statutes include 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994)
(actions against foreign states); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (alien's action for tort); and 28 U.S.C. § 1354 (1994)
(land grants from different states).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1994) (federal officers sued or prosecuted); 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1994) (members
of armed forces sued or prosecuted); 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1994) (civil rights cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (1994)
(foreclosure actions against the United States); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a)(1)(3) (1994) and 1819(b)(2)(D) (1994)
(removal of actions by the RTC and FDIC); 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (1994) (claims related to bankruptcy cases); 12
U.S.C. § 632 (1994) (cases concerning federal regulation of international and foreign banking); 9 U.S.C. § 205
(1994) (arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards); 22 U.S.C. § 286(g) (1994) (actions involving International Monetary Fund or
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development); 39 U.S.C. § 409 (1994) (actions in which postal ser-
vice is a party); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994) (actions against a foreign state).
1997]
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Liability Act, certain state court actions against common carriers, state court
actions arising under states' workers' compensation laws, state court Jones Act
claims, certain admiralty actions arising under the "saving to suitors" clause,
state court actions under the Death on the High Seas Act, and certain state court
domestic violence actions. 31 Because the bulk of removal disputes involve diver-
sity or federal question jurisdiction,32 this Article will concentrate only on those
actions.33
1. Diversity Jurisdiction as a Basis for Removal to Federal Court
Statutory diversity jurisdiction exists over controversies between citizens of
different states, and between a state or citizen thereof and a foreign state or its
citizens, provided the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of inter-
est and costs.3 4 For diversity jurisdiction to exist, diversity must be complete.
3 5
That is, all plaintiffs must be diverse in citizenship from all defendants, and no
36
plaintiff may have the same citizenship as any of the defendants. Even assum-
ing complete diversity exists, a defendant may not invoke diversity jurisdiction if
any defendant is a citizen of the state where the suit was filed.37 Thus, if a defen-
dant is sued in his home state, there is no removal jurisdiction, even if good
diversity exists.
Further, the test for diversity jurisdiction applies both at the time suit was filed
and the time the removal notice was filed.3 8 Thus, a change in a party's citizen-
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1994) (actions based on Securities Act of 1933); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1994)
(actions against a railroad arising under FELA); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (1994) (actions against common carriers);
28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1994) (actions arising under states' workers' compensation laws); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994)
(Jones Act claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994) (admiralty actions under "saving to suitors" clause); 46 U.S.C. §
761 (1994) (actions under Death on the High Seas Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d) (1994) (domestic violence
actions).
32. Gordon D. Polozola, Note, The Battle of Removal-Is Delay the Ultimate Weapon?: A Note on Martine
v. National Tea Co., 54 LA. L. REV. 1419 (1994) (parties attempting removal rely primarily on diversity and fed-
eral question jurisdiction).
33. For a thorough discussion of the special statutory grounds conferring and prohibiting the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction, see Fred Shannon & Barbara Nellermoe, To Federal Court and Back Again: Significant
Changes to Removal and Remand Statutes, in SAN ANTONIO TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION SEMINAR: PITFALLS IN
THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE-AND HOW TO AVOID THEM (1989).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
35. See Vasquez v. Alto Bonito Gravel Plant Corp., 56 E3d 689 (5th Cir. 1995); Bankston v. Burch, 27 E3d
164 (5th Cir. 1994). In contrast to the rules requiring only served defendants to join in the notice of removal,
both served and unserved defendants must satisfy the diversity of citizenship requirement. See, e.g., Zaini v.
Shell Oil Co., 853 E Supp. 960 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
36. There are a few exceptions to this rule: first, the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, only
requires that there be two adverse claimants who are of diverse citizenship, even if all claimants are not diverse
from each other; second, in the class action setting, only the citizenship of the named parties is counted in
determining citizenship. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994). Most courts hold that this rule is not jurisdictional and, thus, if a plaintiff
fails to challenge the removal by a timely motion to remand, the defect will be waived. See In re Shell Oil Co.,
932 E2d 1518 (5th Cir. 1991); Korea Exchange Bank v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46 (3d Cir. 1995). But
see Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 E2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding the no-local-defendants rule is jurisdiction-
al in nature). By contrast, lack of complete diversity has been held to be a jurisdictional defect, and thus inca-
pable of waiver. Horton v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 878 E Supp. 902 (S.D. Miss. 1995); Metroplex Infusion Care,
Inc. v. Lone Star Container Corp., 855 F Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
38. Coury v. Prot, 85 E3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1996).
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ship after suit or after removal will not affect diversity jurisdiction.39  This tem-
poral limitation does not apply in cases where a nondiverse party has been volun-
tarily dropped from the case by the plaintiff after filing but before removal. In
that case, the citizenship of the nondiverse party will be disregarded and diversi-• 40
ty jurisdiction will exist, assuming complete diversity of all other parties.
a. Determination of Citizenship
Several detailed rules govern the determination of a party's citizenship. First,
the citizenship of an individual, for diversity purposes, is determined by "domi-
cile" and not mere residence. Domicile is a question of federal law and is said to
be the place of a party's fixed and permanent home or the place where the party
41 42intends to return whenever absent. This rule applies to United States citizens• 43
as well as to permanent resident aliens. And, in cases of doubt about an indi-
vidual's domicile, federal courts look to such factors as where the party pays
taxes, owns a home, votes, banks, registers cars, spends time, and the like.44 A
change in domicile occurs only if an individual begins physically to reside in a
new state and evidences a desire to remain in that domicile indefinitely.45 Thus,
usually, a party who has a domicile will not lose it until it affirmatively acquires
46a new one.
By contrast, a corporation may have more than one place of citizenship. A cor-
poration is deemed a citizen of any state in which it is incorporated as well as the
39. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938); Coury, 85 E3d at 248. However, if a
party manages to change his citizenship before the action is filed, diversity jurisdiction can be created.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Kirkevald, 87 FR.D. 317, 320 (D. Minn. 1980).
40. See S.WS. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 E3d 489 (5th Cir. 1996); Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380
F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967). This exception does not apply when the nondiverse party is involuntarily dismissed,
as, for example, on a summary judgment motion. Canova v. C.R.C., Inc., of La., 602 E Supp. 817 (M.D. La.
1985). Moreover, the nondiverse defendant must actually have been dismissed by the time the removal notice is
filed for the voluntary dismissal rule to apply. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Alto Bonito Gravel Plant Corp., 56 E3d 689
(5th Cir. 1995) (settlement not yet approved by court and thus settling, nondiverse defendant was not yet dis-
missed).
41. Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954).
42. In the case of dual citizenship, only the American nationality is recognized. Coury, 85 E3d at 248.
Thus, for diversity to exist, the parties must satisfy the provision relating to diversity between United States citi-
zens and may not rely upon the "alienage" provision of § 1332. Id.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994). By contrast, true "aliens" or persons who are citizens of another country
and not residing in the United States permanently are diverse from United States citizens due to "alienage," that
is, suits involving these parties would trigger 28 U.S.C. § 1332 dealing with suits between a citizen of the
United States and a citizen of a foreign country.
44. See, e.g., Coury, 85 E3d at 251 (considering places litigant exercises civil and political rights, pays
taxes, owns property, has driver's licence, maintains bank accounts, belongs to clubs, has business or place of
employment, and maintains home).
45. Coury, 85 F.3d at 251.
46. Id. It is possible for an individual to have no domicile. For instance, suppose Xis a citizen of the United
States but is domiciled in England. X would not satisfy diversity requirements as to Y, a citizen of Louisiana,
because X would not be a citizen of any "state" for diversity purposes. See, e.g., Id. (to be a citizen of a state,
individual must be citizen of the United States and be domiciled in a state). See also Smith v. Carter, 545 E2d
909 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977).
1997]
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one state in which it has its principle place of business.47 A corporation's princi-
ple place of business is where the bulk of its total corporate activity takes 
place, 48
and there can only be one principle place of business for the corporation. Thus,
no matter how far-flung the corporation's activities, it is not a citizen of each and
every state in which it operates. Rather, citizenship attaches only in those states
of incorporation and the one state in which the corporation most heavily per-
forms.
The citizenship of unincorporated associations, such as partnerships, joint
ventures, unions, and the like, is the citizenship of each of their individual mem-
bers.49 With regard to limited partnerships, this includes both general and limited
50partners. In situations involving representative parties, generally the citizenship
of the one who has the legal right to sue and who represents those with beneficial
interests will control. Thus, for example, a trust is a citizen of the state of citi-
zenship of each of its individual trustees." There are exceptions to this rule,
however, in instances of estates of decedents, infants, and incompetents. The
legal representative of an estate is a citizen only of the state of citizenship of the
decedent , and the legal representative of an infant or incompetent is a citizen
only of the state of citizenship of the infant or incompetent.
53
Finally, special rules exist to control certain specific litigation settings. As
mentioned previously, a general rule of diversity jurisdiction is that complete
diversity must exist for diversity to attach. However, the courts have carved out
several exceptions to this rule when the circumstances so demand. First, if
between the time suit is filed and removal is noticed, a nondiverse party is volun-
tarily dismissed, then that party's citizenship will be disregarded at the time
diversity jurisdiction is tested. Second, diversity of citizenship need not exist as
to third-party claims, either between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant or
the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant5 4 Third, the citizenship of
parties merely nominally or formally joined will be disregarded by the courts.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). A similar rule applies to insurers sued pursuant to a direct action statute.
Section 1332(c)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that
in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be
deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the
insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principle place of business.
This proviso does not apply, however, unless the suit is against the insurer. It does not apply to suits by the
insurer. Northbrook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 493 U.S. 6 (1989).
48. Toms v. Country Quality Meats, Inc., 610 E2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1980).
49. United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965); Bankston v. Burch, 27 E3d 164
(5th Cir. 1994). However, it should be noted that states and their alter ego agencies elude diversity jurisdiction
because they are not considered to be citizens at all for diversity purposes. Texas Dep't Hous. & Community
Affairs v. Verey ASSR, 68 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1995).
50. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990); Bankston, 27 F.3d at 168.
51. This is true of trusts generally. Susquehanna & Wyoming Valley R.R. & Coal v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 172 (1870); Navarro Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980) (business trust).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (1994).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Stemmler v. Burke, 344 E2d 393 (6th Cir. 1965); Smith v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 173 F.2d
721 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 819 (1949) (plaintiff and third-party defendant); Huggins v. Graves, 337
E2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964); Southern Milling Co. v. United States, 270 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1959) (third-party plain-
tiff and third-party defendant).
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Fourth, parties subsequently joined to a suit, such as parties joined as part of a•55 • 56
compulsory counter-claim or parties who join as intervenors of right, gener-
ally do not affect diversity jurisdiction. Finally, parties fraudulently joined by a
plaintiff in an effort to defeat diversity jurisdiction will be ignored by the federal
courts in ascertaining whether diversity exists.5 7
b. Calculating the Amount in Controversy
Once it is determined that diverse citizenship exists, the court next investigates
the amount in controversy. Section 1332 provides that the amount in controversy
must exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Unlike the citizenship
requirement, the jurisdictional amount element need only be satisfied at the time
of removal.58 At that point, the court will look to the face of the complaint to
determine whether the amount exists.5 9 If the answer is not apparent from the
face of the complaint or if a party challenges the damages amount ascribed, then
the court will proceed by way of one of two possible tests: (1) the preponderance
of the evidence test or (2) the legal certainty test.
6
0
55. See, e.g., H. L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1967). In the case of the permissive
counter-claim, however, diversity of citizenship must exist. Reynolds v. Maples, 214 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1954).
Moreover, a party who is found to be an indispensable party and who destroys diversity may be joined only at
the court's discretion and, if joined, necessitates remand of the case to state court. Bankston v. Burch, 27 E3d
164, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1994); Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 E2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). Correlatively, the court
may, in its discretion, choose to dismiss a nondiverse, indispensable party, if such dismissal will not prejudice
the remaining defendants. Elliott v. Tilton, 69 E3d 35 (5th Cir. 1995).
56. See, e.g., Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420
E2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970).
57. See Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees, 925 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1991). Defendants seeking to remove
such a case have the burden of establishing fraudulent joinder. Fraudulent joinder will be recognized if a defen-
dant successfully proves actual fraud in naming the nondiverse defendant or demonstrates that there is no possi-
ble way that the plaintiff may recover against the nondiverse defendant under the facts alleged and the relevant
law. See Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F2d 40 (5th Cir. 1992); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663
F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1981). See, e.g., LeJeune v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1992) (state law does not
impose vicarious liability on plant manager unless he owed a personal duty to plaintiff); Carriere v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 893 E2d 98 (5th Cir. 1990) (co-worker was immune from suit unless he committed intentional
misconduct, which was not alleged). A similar rule applies to fraudulent assignments. See, e.g., Smilgrin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 854 E Supp. 464 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (assignment of 1% of interest in order to defeat
diversity jurisdiction).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Richard Schilffarth & Assocs. v. Commonwealth Equity Servs., 715 E Supp. 246,
247 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
59. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938); S.WS. Erectors v. Infax, Inc., 72 E3d
489 (5th Cir. 1996).
60. For a thorough exposition of the various standards applicable in determining the amount in controversy,
see Jack E. Karns, Removal to Federal Court and the Jurisdictional Amount in Controversy Pursuant to State
Statutory Limitations on Pleading Damage Claims, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1091 (1996). Karns carefully traces
the case law of each circuit, noting that a circuit split exists as to the standard applicable in determining juris-
dictional amount when the plaintiff has failed or is precluded from alleging a particular sum of damages. Karns
concludes that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits still apply the "legal certainty" test in such a situation, that the
Sixth Circuit applies the "more likely than not" test, and that the Third and Seventh Circuits apply the "reason-
able probability" test. It should be noted, however, that since the publication of Mr. Karns article, the Fifth
Circuit has relaxed its jurisdictional amount standard, and now applies the preponderance of the evidence test
whenever the complaint in issue does not contain an allegation of a damages amount. See Allen v. R & H Oil &
Gas Co., 63 E3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995). For a more general recount of diversity and the requirement of jurisdic-
tional amount, see Charles A. Carlson, Trial Lawyers Forum: Removal to Federal Court on the Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction: The "'Amount in Controversy" Controversy, 69 FLA. BAR J. 77 (1995).
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The preponderance of the evidence test applies in cases where the plaintiff has
failed to plead a set or determined amount of damages. 1 In certain states, such
62as Louisiana and Texas, this virtually always will be the case, as the state proce-
dural rules expressly prohibit plaintiffs from pleading a sum certain in damages.
In applying the preponderance of the evidence test, the court refers to summary-
judgment types of evidence.63 The defendant need only prove by a preponder-
ance of such evidence that the plaintiff's claim exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional
amount.64 The court, in assessing the defendant's claim, will look first to the
face of the complaint and, if the jurisdictional amount is not apparent, will then
consider facts set forth in the removing party's petition, any affidavits submitted,
65the parties' discovery responses, and other summary-judgment-type evidence
Mere conclusory allegations of removal jurisdiction are not sufficient to satisfy
the preponderance of the evidence test.66 Moreover, the plaintiff may avoid all of
this by filing a binding stipulation or affidavit with his complaint conclusively
limiting its damages to less than $75,000. 67 In fact, even if the plaintiff's state-
ment does not conclusively limit its damages, the court will still find removal
jurisdiction lacking, if the defendant fails to rebut the plaintiff's statement with
other evidence.68
The legal certainty test, by contrast, applies in those cases where the plaintiff
has pleaded a set amount of damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount. 69
This usually only occurs in cases where the plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction
of the federal court.70 In such cases, if the damages amount pled appears to have
been pled in good faith, then the federal court will accept the stated amount as a
presumptively correct assessment of the plaintiff's claim. Only if it appears, "to
a legal certainty, that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount,"
71
will the court dismiss the claim for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
Finally, in those cases where the plaintiff has pleaded a set amount of damages
and that sum is less than the jurisdictional amount, then a combination of the
72preponderance of the evidence and the legal certainty tests applies. In such
cases, the plaintiff's damages allegation is accepted as presumptively correct,
unless the defendant can show that it was made in bad faith.73 The defendant
may do this by way of the preponderance of the evidence test. That is, the defen-
dant need only show by a preponderance of summary-judgment-type evidence
61. Allen, 63 E3d at 1335; De Aquilar v. Boeing Co., II F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1993).
62. See, e.g., TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 47 (West 1996); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 893 (West 1997).
63. S. WS. Erectors, 72 E3d at 482.
64. DeAquilar, 11 F.3d at 58.
65. Allen, 63 E3d at 1335.
66. Id. See also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1992).
67. DeAquilar, 47 F.3d at 1412.
68. See Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores v. Dow Quimica de Colombia S.A., 988 F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir.
1993).
69. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
70. See DeAquilar, 47 F.3d at 1409.
71. Id. at 1409 (quoting St. Paul Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 288-90).
72. Id. at 1410-12.
73. Id. at 1410 (noting a plaintiff may abuse the system by pleading a damages amount below the jurisdic-
tional amount, all along knowing that state laws allow it to recover in excess of that amount).
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that the amount in controversy actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount.74 If
the defendant succeeds in this endeavor, then the plaintiff must come forward
with proof that, to a legal certainty, it will not recover more than the stated
amount. The plaintiff may carry this burden by pointing to state law precluding
recovery in excess of that amount or, if the plaintiff has been insightful enough,
may rely upon the binding stipulation or affidavit filed along with its complaint
that limits its recovery to less than the jurisdictional amount.75
In calculating the jurisdictional amount, the court also must take into account
the types of damages alleged and the number of parties in the case. Section 1332
clearly provides that interest and costs are not counted in determining whether
76the $75,000 amount is met. An exception exists, however, for interest claims
which form part of the underlying obligation, such as a promissory note, or
which are an essential ingredient of the underlying claim 7  Attorneys' fees,
unlike interest and costs, are not statutorily excluded from the calculation of the
jurisdictional amount. Thus, if provided for by contract or statute, attorneys' fees
are included in determining the jurisdictional amount.78 Similarly, claims for
punitive damages may be cumulated with compensatory damages claims to
achieve the required $75,000 amount.7 9 Finally, in cases where a plaintiff seeks
injunctive or declaratory relief, the amount in controversy equates to the value of
the right sought to be protected or the extent of the injury sought to be
prevented. Suits to compel arbitration similarly look to the amount of the
potential underlying award to determine the jurisdictional amount in controversy.
The number of parties in the case and the method of their joinder also influences
the jurisdictional amount. In general, a single plaintiff may aggregate all of his
damages claims against a particular defendant, regardless of whether those claims
are related to each other. Likewise, the claims of two or more plaintiffs against a
particular defendant may be aggregated, provided they seek to enforce a single title
or right that emanates from a common and undivided interest.a2 If the plaintiffs'
claims are separate and distinct, however, then their damage demands may not be
813cumulated. Similarly, the claims of a single plaintiff against multiple and unrelat-
ed defendants may not be cumulated to meet the jurisdictional amount.84
74. Id. at 1412.
75. Id.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Brown v. Webster, 156 U.S. 328 (1895).
78. For a thorough exposition of the various standards applicable in determining the amount in controversy,
see Karns, supra note 60.
79. See Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y of Montgomery, 320 U.S. 238 (1943); Allen v. R. & H. Oil &
Gas Co., 63 E3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995).
80. Webb v. Investacorp., 89 F.3d 252, 256 (5th Cir. 1996).
81. See Jones Motor Co. v. Teledyne, Inc., 690 E Supp. 310 (D. Del. 1988). Although this was clearly the
rule under the pre-1988 amendment law, the amended version of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 casts the viability of this rule
into doubt. Supplemental jurisdiction now requires that all of the claims form part of the same case or contro-
versy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
82. Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 E3d 1326,
1331-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (defining a common, undivided right as one which contemplates only one right of
recovery as opposed to separate rights of recovery).
83. Allen, 63 F.3dat 1331.
84. Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Finally, in class action cases, special rules apply in testing the requirement of
jurisdictional amount. Several circuits have held that claims for punitive dam-
ages and attorneys' fees may be aggregated and then attributed, as a whole, to
compensatory damages claims in satisfaction of the $75,000 amount. For
example, in Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co.,88 the Fifth Circuit, interpreting
Mississippi law, and determined that the sum of all punitive damages claims may
be attributed as a whole to each individual class plaintiff's jurisdictional amount
requirement. 87 The court reached a similar decision with regard to attorneys'
88
fees in In re Abbott Laboratories, but articulated a much broader rule in the
process. In Abbott Laboratories, the court applied Louisiana law, which provid-
ed that all class plaintiffs' attorneys' fees claims could be aggregated and attrib-
uted to each named plaintiff in satisfaction of his jurisdictional amount. 89 The
court then noted that the Judicial Improvements Act of 199090 overruled Zahn v.
International Paper Co.i1 and held that the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction
provides a hook for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the unnamed
plaintiffs' claims.92 Thus, after Abbott Laboratories, even in those cases where
punitive damages or attorneys' fees may only be aggregated in satisfaction of the
named class plaintiffs' jurisdictional amounts, the courts still have subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the unnamed plaintiffs' claims, even if they are for less
than the $75,000 jurisdictional amount.
2. Federal Question Jurisdiction Grounding Removal Jurisdiction
A second popular basis for invoking removal jurisdiction is grounded upon
federal question jurisdiction. Section 1441(b) of Title 28 of the United States
Code provides that federal district courts have federal jurisdiction over cases aris-
ing under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.93 A case is
deemed to "arise under" federal law for § 1331 purposes whenever federal law,
either expressly 94 or impliedly,95 creates the cause of action upon which the plain-
tiff is suing.9r A case also may "arise under" federal law even if state law creates
85. See, e.g., Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11 th Cir. 1996) (aggregating punitive dam-
ages for purposes of determining amount in controversy); Allen, 63 F.3d at 1326 (also aggregating punitive
damages claims and attributing whole amount to each individual plaintiff); In re Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524, 525-
26 (5th Cir. 1995) (aggregating attorney's fees and attributing the whole amount to each named plaintiff).
86. 63 F3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995).
87. Allen, 63 F.3d at 1326.
88. 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
89. Abbott Labs., 51 E3d at 525-26.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (providing for supplemental jurisdiction over related claims).
91. 414 U.S. 291 (1974).
92. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 527-29.
93. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (original federal question jurisdiction); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander,
246 U.S. 276 (1918); Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 99 E3d 730 (5th Cir. 1996).
94. See Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421 (1883).
95. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
96. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). The suit must "really
and substantially" involve a dispute regarding the "validity, construction or effect" of the law "upon the deter-
mination of which the result depends." Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912). See also Gully v. First
Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (federal question jurisdiction requires that the federal issue "be an element, and
an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action").
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the actionable right, provided it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove a
substantial proposition of federal law in making its case. Generally, no cases
other than those falling within these two enumerated categories will be consid-
ered to "arise under" federal question jurisdiction in satisfaction of § 1331.
Removal based on federal question jurisdiction is tested at the time the removal
notice is filed.97
In determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists, courts generally
look to the fact of the plaintiff's "well-pleaded complaint. 9 8 If, on the face of
the plaintiff's complaint, no federal question is apparent, then federal removal
jurisdiction does not exist. 99 The mere fact that a complaint may raise a federal
defense to the plaintiff's claim does not satisfy the federal question require-
ment.'00 The plaintiff is the master of its complaint, and the plaintiff ultimately
decides what law to rely upon and in which court to file suit. The plaintiff, by
filing in state court and refusing to include a federal claim, thus may preclude
the defendant from removing to federal court, even if a federal claim might also
have been alleged in the complaint."'
Of course, like any general rule, there are exceptions to the "well-pleaded com-
plaint" principle. A plaintiff may not defeat federal question jurisdiction merely,• 102
by "artfully casting" a federal cause of action as a state law claim. Secondly,
some areas of federal law so pervade a particular field of law that they complete-
ly preempt state law, thereby rendering the cause of action filed in state court
removable. 0 3 Finally, in those instances in which Congress has expressly provid-
97. Cervantez, 99 F.3d at 733; Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 E2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983); Libhart v. Santa
Monica Dairy Co., 592 E2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, even if a plaintiff amends its complaint to drop a fed-
eral claim, removal jurisdiction will still exist. In such cases, the federal court has discretion, however, to dis-
miss the remaining state law claims or to remand the action back to state court. Similarly, a post-removal
amendment to the plaintiff's petition to add a federal claim will not cure lack of removal jurisdiction. However,
in such cases, the defendant may try to remove again based upon the newly alleged federal. question jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., S.WS. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 E3d 489,492-94 (5th Cir. 1996).
98. Gully, 229 U.S. at 113; Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir. 1996).
99. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
100. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989). See also Gaar v. Quirk, 86 F3d 451,454 (5th
Cir. 1996); Kramer, 80 E3d at 1082. This is true even if the plaintiff concedes that the federal question is the
only true issue in the case. See, e.g., Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
101. See Great N. Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 281 (1918). See also Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch.
Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1988); Aaron v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 876 F.2d 1157, 1161 n.7 (5th Cir. 1989).
102. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981). See also Gaar, 96 E3d at 454; Eitman v.
New Orleans Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) (failure to plead federal
claim was in bad faith and mere attempt to defeat jurisdiction). But see Willy, 855 E2d at 1160 (plaintiff's
complaint not subject to "artfil pleading" limitation where plaintiff had alternative state law claim).
103. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (ERISA); Kramer, 80 F.3d at 1082
(same); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) (LMRA); Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 87
E3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); Kollar v, United Transp. Union, 83 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1996) (RLA). See also
Masters v. Swiftships Freeport, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (for complete preemption to occur, fed-
eral statute must include civil enforcement provision that creates federal cause of action and protects same
interest protected by the preempted state law, provides a specific jurisdictional grant to federal courts over such
action, and shows a clear congressional intent to preempt state law). The interaction between federal preemp-
tion and federal law as a defense is a gray one. Complete preemption occurs only when federal law occupies
the entire field of liability, thus rendering state relief impermissible. In such cases, the plaintiff's claim must be
recharacterized as a federal one. Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 557. If, however, federal law merely provides that a
particular remedy under state law would violate federal law, and the field is not completely preempted, then the
plaintiff may still press his claim in state court. In the latter case, federal preemption is merely a defense to the
state claim, and thus does not trigger removal jurisdiction. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983). See also Hartle v. Packard Elec., 877 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1989); Carway v.
Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 183 B.R. 769 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
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ed by statute for removal of a particular type of action, the plaintiff may not
avoid the federal forum by filing in state court. Removal in such cases is a mat-
ter of statutory right, and the defendant, therefore, has the right 
to remove. 1 4
Similarly, in instances where a complaint appears to raise a federal claim,
exceptions exist to the recognition of federal question jurisdiction. A suit may be
dismissed for lack of federal question jurisdiction where the alleged federal
claim clearly appears to be "immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction.', 05 A suit may also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
where the federal question proves to be "wholly insubstantial and frivolous" in
nature. 1 6 Finally, and as previously discussed, certain federal claims may not be
removed based on congressional mandates against removal. In such cases,
removal is prohibited by statute.0 7
Thus, with a few exceptions, federal question jurisdiction will exist if the com-
plaint contains a claim "arising under" federal law. In such cases, the entirety of
the case may be removed to federal court. 0 8 This is true even if non-federal
issues must also be determined because supplemental jurisdiction provides a
jurisdictional hook. The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction provides that
"supplemental jurisdiction [shall attach to] all [additional] claims that are so
related to claims in the action within [the district court's federal jurisdiction] that
they form part of the same case or controversy."' 0 9 Thus, pursuant to § 1367,
state claims forming part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims
may also be tried by the federal court."0
3. Separate and Independent Claims
Similarly, state and federal claims which are ."separate and independent" also
may be tried in federal court, provided the mandates of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) are
satisfied. Section 1441 (c) provides the following:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within [federal
question] jurisdiction . . . is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court
104. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (listing federal statutes conferring federal jurisdiction for
removal purposes).
105. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946). See also Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 99
E3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
106. Id. at683.
107. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
108. See New Orleans, Mobile & Texas R.R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135 (1880).
109. 28U.S.C. § 1367(1994).
110. Similarly, supplemental jurisdiction allows the federal court to continue to hear the case even after the
claims over which it had subject matter jurisdiction have dropped out. See Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 E3d
448 (5th Cir. 1996). Once subject matter jurisdiction has attached, the court has the discretion to keep or
remand the state law claims. Id. See also Smith v. Texas Children's Hosp., 84 E3d 152 (5th Cir. 1996). In
making the decision whether to keep or remand the claims, however, the court should "exercise [its] discretion
in a way that best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Doddy, 101 F.3d at
456. If the federal claim is eliminated early in the federal proceeding, the court has a "powerful reason" to
remand the state law claims to state court. Id.
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may determine all issues therein or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in
which State law predominates.1 
on'
By definition, removal under § 1441(c) is limited to cases in which the remov-
able "separate and independent" claim arises under federal question jurisdiction.
It should be noted, moreover, that § 1441 (c) need not be invoked when the claims
sought to be removed are related, as supplemental jurisdiction provides the juris-
dictional hook in such cases.
Thus, in short, § 1441(c) comes into play only when unrelated claims are
joined in a state court suit. When this occurs, the law allows the defendant to
remove the entire case to federal court, provided one or more claims satisfy fed-
eral question jurisdiction. Such removal is subject to the court's discretion to
remand the "separate and independent" claims, however, if those claims are gov-
erned predominantly by state law."' For a remand order to be proper, the claims
remanded must be (1) separate and independent claims, (2) joined with a federal
claim, (3) otherwise nonremovable, and (4) involve a matter over which state law• 113
predominates.
The Supreme Court has defined "separate and independent" claims as claims
arising from different sets of acts and different wrongs inflicted upon the plain-
tiff. That is, "where there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought,
arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and inde-
pendent claim . ,,114 The Fifth Circuit has bifurcated the "separate and inde-
pendent" inquiry, defining "separateness" as the Supreme Court did in Americanr-. 115
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, and adding an additional test for "independent-
ness." According to this Circuit, a claim that "involve[s] 'substantially the same
facts"' is not independent. 116 In making this determination, the allegations of the•11718
complaint control. Thus, in Eustus v. Blue Bell Creameries,"' the Fifth Circuit
found that an employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
emanating from the employee's termination was not separate and independent
from a Family and Medical Leave Act claim, but the employee's claim for tor-
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994).
112. Id.
113. Eustus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1996). In many circuits, it is unclear
whether § 1441(c) allows the federal court to remand the entire case or only those claims governed by state law.
Some courts have allowed remand of cases in their entirety, while others refuse to do so, holding once subject
jurisdiction attaches the federal court may not remand the claim. For a thorough analysis of the power of feder-
al courts to remand pursuant to § 1441(c), see Edward Hartnett, A New Trick from an Old and Abused Dog:
Section 1441(c) Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal Question Cases, 63 FORtHAM L. RE. 1099
(1995). Notably, as demonstrated by Eustus, the Fifth Circuit has refused to extend § 1441(c) to allow remand
of the entire case, stating instead that a district court has no discretion to remand a case over which it has sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Eustus, 97 F.3d at 106. See also Buchner v. FDIC, 981 E2d 816 (5th Cit. 1993).
114. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951). See also Eustus, 97 F.3d at 104. Notably,
while federal law supplies the test for what is a "separate and independent" claim, state law must be applied to
determine the character of the plaintiff's claim. That is, state law is employed to determine whether the claim
partakes of federal jurisdiction under federal question or diversity jurisdiction. See Bentley v. Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co., 174 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1949).
115. 341 U.S. 6(1951).
116. Eustus, 97 E3d at 104.
117. Id.
118. 97 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1996).
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tious interference with a prospective employment contract was separate and inde-
pendent and, accordingly, could be remanded.
C. To "Where" Must the Case Be Removed?
Once it is determined that a case is removable, the next question is to "where?"
The obvious answer is "to federal court," but a not-so-obvious venue rule gov-
erns the exact federal court.119 Section 1441 provides that a case removable from
state to federal court should be removed "to the district court for the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending." 120 In simpler terms, the state case should be removed to the federal
court presiding over the same geographic area as the state court from which it
was removed. Venue in the federal court will be proper if venue in the sister
state court was proper.121 If the case is removed to the wrong federal court, the
plaintiff promptly must raise this procedural defect by a timely motion to• ,122
remand; otherwise, the defect is waived. If such a challenge is timely made,
however, the remedy is to transfer the case to the appropriate federal district
court, assuming subject matter jurisdiction is not in question.1
23
Once a case has been removed to federal court, either party may move to trans-
fer the case to the appropriate venue pursuant to § 1404(a). This is true even if
venue is proper in the transferring district. 12  Moreover, a party may also move
to dismiss the federal case under § 1404(a) pursuant to forum non conveniens.125
The' Fifth Circuit just recently upheld such a transfer, determining that a wrong-
ful death-suit premised on the crash of a Mexican airplane in Mexico would be
more appropriately tried in Mexico.
126
D. "When " Must a Case Be Removed from State to Federal Court?
The next step to ensuring proper removal of a case to federal court involves the
timing of removal. Section 1446 governs this inquiry:
(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal
prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States
for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of
removal ....
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). In determining the appropriate venue, the removal statute, not the federal
venue statutes, controls. See Tamminga v. Suter, 213 E Supp. 488, 493 (N.D. Iowa 1962).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994) (notice of removal must be filed in "dis-
trict and division within which [state] action is pending").
121. Venue in the federal court may even be proper if venue in the state court was not proper, as some courts
construe the removal to a particular federal court as a waiver of any venue challenges. See, e.g., Seaboard Rice
Milling Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 270 U.S. 363,46 S. Ct. 247 (1926).
122. Cook v. Shell Chem. Co., 730 E Supp. 1381 (M.D. La. 1990).
123. S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 E3d 489, 493 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996).
124. St. Cyr v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 486 E Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
125. See, e.g., De Aquilar v. Boeing, Inc., 11 E3d 55 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudi
Arabia, 540 E Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1982).
126. DeAquilar, 11 E3d at 58-59.
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(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within
thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such
action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons
upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is. 127
not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
Thus, in general, the defendant must file the notice of removal within thirty days
of receipt of the pleading setting forth a removable cause of action.
The courts are split, however, regarding whether the time for filing the removal
notice runs from mere receipt of the pleading, regardless of whether it has been
served, or only from the time of formal service. The former rule, and the one
sanctioned by the language of § 1446, is known as the "receipt rule." Pursuant to
the "receipt rule," the time for removal runs from the time the defendant actually
receives the pleading, regardless of whether formal service has occurred." 9 In
this regard, provided the pleading has been filed, receipt of a courtesy copy of the
pleading by the defendant starts the removal clock ticking.1 3 0 As stated, this rule
seems to be expressly sanctioned by § 1446, which states that the removal notice
must be filed within thirty days of receipt of the pleading, whether receipt
occurred "through service or otherwise."
Nonetheless, some courts view this rule as a harsh one, and instead apply the
"proper service rule." Pursuant to the "proper service rule," the thirty-day delay
in which a notice of removal must be filed is triggered only upon proper service
of process of the pleading containing the ground for removal. 132  These courts
rationalize that the "or otherwise" language contained in § 1446(b) either was
intended by Congress to apply only to those states in which suit commences133 . 134
without proper service 133 or is simply too ambiguous to be enforceable.
127. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(a) and (b). The notice of removal in criminal prosecutions must be filed within thirty
days of arraignment, if arraignment occurs, or any time before trial, if arraignment does not occur. 28 U.S.C. §
1446(c) (1994).
128. An excellent review of this subject matter was written by Robert P. Faulkner, The Courtesy Copy Trap:
Untimely Removal from State to Federal Court, 52 MD. L. REv. 374 (1993). Faulkner surmises that the receipt
rule, not the proper service rule, is the rule required by the wording of the statute. Faulkner recognizes the
unfairness inherent in this rule, however, and therefore calls for congressional reform.
129. See Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 1996); Roe v. O'Donahue, 38 E3d 298 (7th Cir.
1994); Tech-Hills Assoc. v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 5 E3d 963 (6th Cir. 1993); Blair v. Williford, 891
E Supp. 349 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Burr v. Choice Hotels, Int'l, 848 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Tex. 1994); James v. Pan Am.
Life Ins. Co., No. 91-0821, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11564 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 1991); York v. Horizon Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 712 E Supp. 85 (E.D. La. 1989); Kurtz v. Harris, 245 F Supp. 752 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
130. See, e.g., Reece, 98 E3d at 842 (period for removal begins on receipt of file-stamped copy of petition in
mail, even if petition was not signed).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994). See, e.g., Reece, 98 E3d at 841 (plain language of§ 1446 mandates adher-
ence to the "receipt rule").
132. See Valentine Sugars, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No.89-2524, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16028 (E.D.
La. Jan. 19, 1990); Thomason v. Republic Ins. Co., 630 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Ca. 1986); Hunter v. American
Express Travel Related Servs., 643 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Love v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 542
F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Rodriquez v. Hearty, 121 F Supp. 125 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
133. Love, 542 E Supp. at 67 (in such states, the action commences prior to receipt of the petition and, there-
fore, has the potential to deprive the defendant of the removal option because he will not receive a pleading
containing a removable claim until after the removal delay has run).
134. Marion Corp. v. Lloyds Bank, 738 E Supp. 1377 (S.D. Ala. 1990). See also Hunter, 643 F. Supp. at 169.
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A subpart of the "when" inquiry involves "who" must receive the removable
petition for the thirty-day delay to begin running. Obviously, in the business
context, receipt by or service upon an authorized agent is sufficient to start the
delay period running. 135 What of receipt by or service upon an unauthorized
agent, however? Some courts have held that this is insufficient to trigger the
thirty-day period for removal.
136
Similarly, in cases involving multiple defendants, does the thirty day period
begin upon receipt by or service upon the first defendant or upon receipt by or
service upon the last one? The Fifth Circuit has held that all defendants must
join in the notice of removal within thirty days of receipt of the petition by the
first defendant. 137 Other courts have held that this rule unfairly penalizes later-
served defendants, however, and, thus, allows each defendant to join in the notice
of removal within thirty days of receipt or service of its petition.
1
'3
Finally, if, by chance, the above rules are violated and the defendant fails to
file his removal notice timely, most courts hold that they lack the discretion to
extend the thirty-day time delay.139 In fact, at least one court has held that the
period may not even be extended pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(e), which adds an additional three days to take action following service by
mail. 140  Of course, the defendant's failure to file the notice of removal timely
will be of no consequence if the plaintiff also fails to file a motion to remand
timely. Failure to file a notice of removal timely is considered to be a procedural
removal defect and, thus, is waivable if not timely challenged.
1. Removability Not Ascertainable from Original Petition
Application of the thirty-day rule for removing state court actions becomes
trickier when the petition does not clearly evidence a removable claim. The thir-
ty-day period begins to run only once the defendant receives a "'paper from
which it may first be ascertained' that the case is ... removable." '41 Thus, if on
the face of the initial petition, it is not apparent that a removable claim exists, the
135. See Tech-Hills Assoc. v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F3d 963 (6th Cir. 1993); Getty Oil Corp. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 E2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988).
136. See, e.g., Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1996) (The court noted that a cor-
poration is not deemed to have received a petition just because anyone in the company is served, but declined to
establish a bright-line test for determining whose receipt is sufficient to start the delay period running. In
Reece, however, the petition was received by the CEO of the company, and that was sufficient to trigger the
removal delay period). Cf TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11 (permitting service on selected officers); LA.
CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1261 (West 1995) (permitting service on corporation's designated agent or, if not, on
any officer); Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) (permitting service on any officer).
137. Getty Oil Corp., 841 E2d at 1254.
138. McKinney v. Board of Trustees, 955 E2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992). Even the Fifth Circuit has suggested it
may create exceptions to its "joinder within thirty days of receipt by the first defendant" rule, when the equities
so demand. Doe v. Kerwood, 969 F.2d 165, 169 n.15 (1992).
139. See, e.g., Buchner v. FDIC, 98 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 1993); Ortiz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583
E Supp. 526 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
140. See Ross v. Barrett Centrifugals, 580 F Supp. 1510 (D. Me. 1984). But see Student A v. Metcho, 710 E
Supp. 267 (N.D. Ca. 1989) (granting three day extension). Obviously, the FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e) extension is only
applicable in those circuits following the "proper service" rule for computing the delay period.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994). See S.WS. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 E3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1996);
Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 1993) (Notice of removal must be filed within thirty
days of receipt of document from which it may first be ascertained removal jurisdiction exists).
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time period for filing a notice of removal does not run until receipt of "a plead-
ing, motion, order or other paper" from which removability may be ascer-
tained. 142 Most courts hold that removability must be discovered from a "paper."- 143 144 • • 145
That is, changes in the law, court orders, and verbal communications from
opposing counsel do not suffice to trigger the removal time delay. The Fifth
Circuit has held, moreover, that the "other paper" must somehow come about
through a voluntary act of the plaintiff. Thus, while an affidavit of defense coun-
sel attesting to the presence of a removable claim is not an "other paper" that will
trigger the thirty-day delay period, a transcript of the plaintiff's deposition testi-
mony is sufficient to start the delay.
146
Finally, both in diversity and federal question settings, uncertainties about
whether a removable claim exists may or may not render the complaint's remov-
ability uncertain. Some courts hold that for diversity purposes, a defendant is
accountable not only for his own state of citizenship but also for the state of citi-
zenship of the plaintiff.147 With regard to the amount in controversy, interrogato-
ries, requests for admission, and other discovery devices may be used to ferretS•148
out the true value of the plaintiff's claim. Finally, with regard to federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, the federal nature of the claim generally must be ascertainable
from the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Thus, if the claim is uncertain, the
right to remove the action usually is triggered only once the defendant receives
notice that the action is, in fact, based on a federal claim.'" It also must be
remembered that removal jurisdiction is tested, in the case of diversity jurisdic-
tion, both at the time the complaint and the time the removal petition is filed, and
in the case of federal question jurisdiction, only at the time the removal petition
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994).
143. See, e.g., Phillips v. Allstate Ins. Co., 702 E Supp. 1466 (C.D. Ca. 1989) (new Act of Congress permit-
ting removal not a "paper" triggering thirty-day delay).
144. S.WS. Erectors, 72 F.3d at 494.
145. See, e.g., Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 E2d 160 (5th Cir. 1992) (delay runs only from receipt of a
"paper affirmatively revealing on its face" the presence of a removable claim). See also Leffal v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 28 E3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994) (same). Cf Mielke v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (mere knowledge that removable claim exists is sufficient).
146. S. WS. Erectors, 72 E3d at 494. See Morrison v. National Ben. Life Ins. Co., 889 R Supp. 945 (S.D.
Miss. 1995) (motion for leave to amend petition to allege amount in controversy greater than jurisdictional
amount deemed "other paper" triggering delay); Rivers v. International Matex Tank Terminal, 864 E Supp. 556
(E.D. La. 1994) (deposition transcript deemed "other paper"); Johnson v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 836 F.
Supp. 390 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (plaintiff's answers to requests for admission deemed "other paper").
147. See, e.g., Lee v. Volkswagen of America, 429 E Supp. 5 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Jong v. General Motors
Corp., 359 E Supp. 223 (N.D. Ca. 1973).
148. See In re Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., No. 96-10743, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760 (5th Cir. June 28,
1996).
149. See, e.g., Akin v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 851 E Supp. 819, 825 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Brooks v. Solomon Co.,
542 E Supp. 1229, 1230 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (federal question became apparent upon taking of plaintiff's deposi-
tion).
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is filed. Thus, post-removal amendments to create or destroy removal jurisdic-
tion generally will have no effect on removability.
150
2. Cases that Become Removable After Filing
Nevertheless, § 1446(b) does provide one way in which later actions taken by
the plaintiff may affect removability. Even if the initial petition was unremov-
able, it may become removable upon the filing of "an amended pleading, motion,
order, or other paper." 15  As noted by the Fifth Circuit in S. WS. Erectors, Inc. v.
Infax, Inc., this new removability must result from a voluntary act of the
plaintiff. 1' This rule, in turn, reflects the general rule that the plaintiff is the
master of his complaint. Thus, for example, if a plaintiff chooses voluntarily to
dismiss a nondiverse defendant or to settle with such a defendant, then removal
jurisdiction would exist and the thirty-day delay for removing would 
begin.153
Similarly, amendment to a petition alleging only state law claims to add claims
based on federal law would trigger the thirty-day delay for removal jurisdic-
tion.1
5 4
This rule allowing new-found removability is subject to one important excep-
tion: "a case may not be removed on the basis of [diversity] jurisdiction ...
more than one year after commencement of the action." 5 5  Although, as dis-
cussed by commentators,156 this rule is subject to manipulation and abuse, some
courts have held that it is, nonetheless, mandatory in nature. Therefore, though
tempted to do so, these courts have refused to carve out equitable exceptions to
the one-year bar on removability in diversity cases, deeming the policy con-
cerns 57 undergirding that rule to be weightier than the unfairness attendant to
1581
particular defendants in particular cases. Other courts will recognize equitable
150. Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Once district court found that it
had jurisdiction, the jurisdiction is deemed to have vested in the court at the time of removal."). Thus, a court
has discretion to retain jurisdiction over state court claims pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction, even if the
claims over which it had subject matter jurisdiction have dropped out. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988). Similarly, a post-removal reduction of the amount in controversy in a diversity
case will not affect federal court jurisdiction. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283
(1938). An exception to the rule of continuing jurisdiction exists, however, when the court is forced to add a
nondiverse indispensable party to the case. There, diversity jurisdiction is destroyed and the court must remand
the action back to state court. Bankston v. Burch, 27 E3d 164, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1994). Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e)
(1994) (request for leave to join nondiverse but dispensable party subject to court's discretion; if granted, how-
ever, case must be remanded).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994).
152. S. WS. Erectors, 72 F3d at 494. See also Self v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1978).
153. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 E2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1988). Cf Canova v. C.R.C., Inc.,
602 E Supp. 817 (M.D. La. 1985) (unremovable case did not become removable based on court's dismissal of
nondiverse defendant).
154. See, e.g., Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 E3d 301 (5th Cir. 1993) (amendment to add ERISA claim).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994).
156. See, e.g., Gordon D. Polozola, supra note 32, at 1421-22. ("By delaying service ... for over a year,
plaintiffs [can] ensure[] that [their] action [can] not be timely removed... to a federal forum.").
157. Congress inserted the one-year limitation to prevent removal of cases after they have progressed substan-
tially in state court. H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-73 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 6031-33.
158. See, e.g., Martine v. National Tea Co., 841 F. Supp. 1421, 1422 (M.D. La. 1993) (although the court
noted that the case in Martine had not progressed substantially in state court, it nonetheless found that "[i]t is
for Congress and not this Court to rewrite the provisions of § 1446(b) to curb such abuses."). See also Hedges
v. Hedges Gauging Serv., Inc., 837 F Supp. 753 (M.D. La. 1993) (same).
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exceptions, however, at least where they perceive purposeful manipulation and
abuse by the plaintiff.159 Moreover, because the one-year time limitation, like the
thirty-day delay, is merely procedural in nature, failure to timely challenge a
delinquent removal will result in waiver of that rule.160 Thus, although this will
not curb purposeful manipulation of the rule by the plaintiff, it will grant the
defendant some much-needed reprieve whenever the plaintiff fails timely to
move to remand the untimely removal petition.
E. "How" Does a Party Go About Removing a Case from State to Federal Court?
We now come to the mechanics of removing a case from state to federal court.
In a nutshell, the defendant must file a "notice of removal" with the appropriate
federal court within thirty days of receipt (or service) of the complaint contain-
ing the removable claim. If the case involves multiple defendants, all defendants
served in the state action must join in the notice of removal. 16 If the ground for
removal is diversity, the defendants must file the notice of removal within one
year of commencement of the action. The notice of removal, which must be
signed in accordance with Rule 11,162 should contain a short and plain statement
of the grounds justifying the removal and should append a copy of all processes,




The defendants also must file a copy of the removal papers with the state court
and must give prompt notice of the removal to all adverse parties. Upon the fil-
ing of the copies with the state court, the case is officially removed, and the state
court may no longer proceed.164 This is true even if removal is improper as, until. .. . 165
the case is remanded to state court, the state court is ousted of jurisdiction. If
the state court persists in hearing the case, it can be enjoined from doing so by
the federal court.
166
The content of the removal notice depends upon the grounds for removal as
well as local rules. Many courts require by local rule that the removing party
include such things as a civil cover sheet, a notice of related cases, and specific
jurisdictional allegations. 167 In federal question cases, the notice of removal need
only allege that removal is based on a claim "arising under" federal law and state
the federal statutory basis for that claim. If the federal claim is not obvious from
the face of the plaintiff's complaint, the allegation also should explain why feder-
al law applies. The notice of removal in diversity cases should include a state-
159. See, e.g., Saunders v. Wire Rope Corp., 777 E Supp. 1281 (E.D. Va. 1991); Greer v. Skilcraft, 704 F
Supp. 1570 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
160. Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 999
(1992).
161. See supra notes 10-24 and accompanying text.
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The removing parties thus certify that to the best of their knowledge and belief,
removal of the case is warranted. If the federal court determines that the removing party did not accurately
investigate the basis of federal jurisdiction, it may impose sanctions pursuant to § 1447(c).
163. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(a) and (b) (1994).
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1994).
165. Murray v. Ford Motor Co., 770 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1985). See also E.D. Sys. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell
Tel., 674 F.2d 453, 457-58 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (the propriety of the removal is for the federal court to decide).
166. Frith v. Blazon-Flexible Flyer, Inc., 512 E2d 899, 901 (5th Cir. 1975).
167. See HITTNER, supra note 5, at 2:963.
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ment of each party's citizenship, both at the time of the action's filing and the
time of the removal, and should state that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 168 It should then declare that federal
jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship and that all plaintiffs and defendants
are diverse. Finally, in cases where federal jurisdiction is conferred by special
statute, the removing party should allege this and should cite to the appropriate
federal statute. In all instances of removal, moreover, despite the jurisdictional
basis, the notice of removal should state that all defendants join in the notice of
removal or explain why certain defendants do not.169 Although the notice of
removal need only be signed by one defendant, the defendants who do not sign
should submit a written notice ofjoinder.
170
The notices to adverse parties and to state court are relatively simple. First,
both notices must be in writing.171 Second, the notice to adverse parties should
inform them that the case has been removed and should explain why.
Technically, it is not sufficient simply to serve the adverse parties with a copy of
the federal notice of removal. A copy of the federal court notice and the state
court notices, should be appended, however. Finally, the state court notice should
inform the state court of the removal and should include, in addition to a copy of
the federal removal papers, a copy of the notice served on the adverse parties."'
Once these steps are taken, removal to federal court is complete.
Sections 1447 and 1448 of Title 28 of the United States Code govern federal
court procedure once a case has been removed to federal court. Initially, the fed-
eral court takes the case as it finds it, recognizing all state court orders, discovery
rulings, motions for extensions, and the like.17 3 Upon removal, however, federal
procedural rules begin to govern.1
7 4 Thus, if a defendant has not yet answered, 17
its answer must be filed "within 20 days after ... service of summons (the com-
plaint) ... or within 5 days after filing of the notice of removal, whichever peri-
od is longest.'' 76 Its answer must, moreover, conform to the strictures of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the mere fact that a defendant
has removed a case does not preclude it from making jurisdictional challenges.
The defendant may still invoke Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
168. Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Co., 287 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1961). If a party has more than
one state of citizenship, as may be the case with a corporation, then each state of citizenship should be listed.
169. See, e.g., Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Allison, 756 F. Supp. 290, 291 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
170. See, e.g., Roe v. O'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1994) (insufficient to merely allege that all
defendants join). And, remember, copies of the pleadings from the state proceeding must accompany the notice
of removal. A copy of the notices sent to the state court and to the adverse parties should also be included. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1994).
172. Id.
173. Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Ca. 1981).
174. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c) ("These rules apply to civil actions removed ... and govern procedures after
removal."); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992).
175. Defendants who answered in state court need not file a new answer unless instructed to do so by the fed-
eral court. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 1(c).
176. Id.
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177
to challenge service of process or personal jurisdiction, provided it did not
waive these challenges in state court prior to removal. 17  Finally, the issue of jury
demand can be tricky once removal has occurred. If a jury was demanded in
state court prior to removal, the demand need not be renewed.' 79 But, if a jury
was not demanded, a formal jury demand must be filed in accordance with Rule
38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The timing of the demand depends
upon the status of the case at the time the case was removed:
(1) If no answer was filed in state court prior to removal, either party may make
formal demand for a jury no later than 10 days after service of the last pleading
directed to a jury-triable issue.180
(2) If an answer was filed prior to removal
(a) the defendant must file his jury demand within 10 days after filing its notice
of the removal, and
(b) the plaintiff must file his jury demand within 10 days after service of the
notice of removal. 
8 1
Failure to file a timely jury demand constitutes a waiver of the right to trial by
jury
82
IV THE WAY OF REMAND BACK TO STATE COURT
The plaintiff3 may, of course, determine that removal was improper and move
to remand back to state court. Section 1447 of Title 28 of the United States Code
governs remand to state court:
(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure
must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice or removal under sec-
tion 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order
remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of
177. Because service probably will have occurred while the parties were still in state court, the validity of that
service will be judged according to the state's standards. Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1986).
Service after removal is governed by federal standards, however. 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (1994) (if defendant is not
served or is improperly served before removal, new service or proper service should follow federal mandates).
178. A defendant may have waived these challenges in state court by, for example, making a general appear-
ance or answering prior to removal. See, e.g., Nationwide Eng'g & Control Sys. v. Thomas, 837 F.2d 345
(8th Cir. 1988).
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
181. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
182. Id. But see Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees, 925 E2d 886 (5th Cir. 1991) (court has discretion to
grant relief from waiver).
183. Normally, the plaintiff will be the party seeking remand. However, any party, even the removing defen-
dant, may request remand if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,
341 U.S. 6 (1951). Moreover, a defendant who did not join in the notice of removal may move for remand on
any ground, procedural or jurisdictional. See Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir.
1988).
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the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court.
The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.134
This provision raises an important sub-issue: What constitutes a defect in
removal procedure as opposed to a defect affecting subject matter jurisdiction?
The answer to this question is an important one, as the nature of the defect dic-
tates the power of the court to remand the case to state court.
A. Procedural Versus Jurisdictional Defects
If the removal defect is based on procedural error, the plaintiff has only thirty
days'from the filing of the removal notice to file a motion to remand; otherwise,
the defect is waived. 1 8 5 If the removal defect is based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, any party may move at any time to have the case remanded, and the
federal court may even act sua sponte to remand the case. 18 6 Jurisdictional•- . 187 - 188
defects include lack of diverse citizenship and lack of a federal question. By
contrast, procedural defects include such things as tardy filing of the removal
notice, 189 defects in the form or content of the removal notice,' 9° failure to give
notice to the adverse parties or the state court,'9 violation of the "no-local-defen-
dants" rule,1 92 and failure to join all necessary defendants. 193 Some courts broad-
en this category, and also include any nonjurisdictional defect; thus, such things
as removal of cases that are statutorily unremovable194 and failure to file a notice
of removal within one year of commencement of the action in diversity cases
would constitute mere procedural defects.
19 5
Assuming the defect is procedural, the plaintiff has only thirty days from the
filing of the notice of removal to file its motion to remand. The Fifth Circuit has
held that this period may not be extended - not even by Federal Rule 6(e),
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994).
185. Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Loyd, 955 E2d 316 (5th Cir. 1992). The courts
are split over whether the court may remand sua sponte on the basis of a procedural defect. Compare Page v.
City of Southfield, 45 E3d 128 (6th Cir. 1995) and In re Continental Casualty Co., 29 E3d 292 (7th Cir. 1994)
and In re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F3d 219 (5th Cir. 1993) (failure of plaintiff to raise procedural defect deemed
waiver of right to remand on that ground) with Maniar 979 E2d at 784; Air-Shields, Inc., 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.
1989) (court may remand for procedural defect sua sponte if such remand occurs within thirty days of the
notice of removal) and Averdick v. Republic Fin. Servs., 803 E Supp. 37 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (allowing court to
remand for procedural defects at any time).
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1994). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be agreed upon or waived by the parties.
See Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 1996); IMFC Professional Servs. of Fla. v. Latin Am. Home Health,
Inc., 676 E2d 152 (5th Cir. 1982).
187. See Coury, 85 F.3d at 252; Horton v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 878 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Miss. 1995);
Metroplex Infusion Care, Inc. v. Lone Star Container Corp., 855 E Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
188. See Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1994).
189. See, e.g., Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 888 E2d 779 (11 th Cir. 1989).
190. See, e.g., In re Allstate, 8 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 1993); Harper v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 494 F
Supp. 234 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
191. See, e.g., Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1985).
192. See, e.g., Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518 (5th Cir.
1991).
193. See, e.g., Roe v. O'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 1994); Fontenot v. Global Marine, Inc., 703 F.2d 867
(5th Cir. 1983).
194. See Patin v. Allied Signal, Inc., 77 E3d 782, 786 (5th Ci. 1996); Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 E2d
1540 (5th Cir. 1991).
195. See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 E2d 513 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 999 (1992).
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which provides an additional three days in which to act following service of a
pleading by mail.'9 This makes sense, as the thirty-day delay does not run from
service, but from filing. 97 This rule is consistent with the rule requiring defen-
dants to file their notice of removal within thirty days, moreover, as that rule can-
not be extended by Rule 6(e), either'9
B. Court Ruling on the Motion to Remand
Pursuant to § 1444(c), the court is authorized to remand the case based on pro-
cedural defects or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
held that federal district courts do not have discretion to create other grounds.
Thus, in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,199 the Court held that a fed-
eral court may not remand a properly removed case simply because it thinks its
200docket is too crowded to afford timely review. Correlatively, if a procedural or
jurisdictional defect renders removal improper, the courts have no discretion but
to remand. Section 1447(c) states that the courts "shall remand" cases that are
201improperly removed from state to federal court. Some courts have created a
practical exception to this rule, allowing the removing party to correct a proce-
dural defect, provided it does so within the thirty days allotted for removal . 2
Federal courts do have discretion to remand cases in certain discrete instances,
however. If removal was based on federal question jurisdiction and the federal
question subsequently drops out, the court may choose to retain the supplemental
state law claims, dismiss them, or remand them to state court.2°3 Similarly, if the
case contains "separate and independent" claims, some of which are based on
federal question jurisdiction and others of which are unremovable, the court has
the discretion to retain the entire case or to remand the "separate and indepen-
204
dent" claims if they are governed predominantly by state law. Finally, in the
diversity context, the federal district court has the discretion to allow joinder of a
nondiverse, dispensable party and to remand the case to state court or to deny the
205
request for the joinder and to retain the case in federal court.
196. Pavone v. Miss. Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 E3d 560 (5th Cir. 1995).
197. Id. at 566.
198. See supra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
199. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
200. Id. See also Levy v: Weissman, 671 F.2d 766 (3rd Cir. 1982) (no discretion to remand as a sanction);
Ryan v. State Board of Elections, 661 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1981) (no discretion to remand as a form of absten-
tion); In re Shell Oil Co., 631 E2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1980) (no discretion to remand for failure to oppose motion
to remand).
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994).
202. See O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 856 E2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Loftin v. Rush, 767 F.2d
800 (11 th Cir. 1985); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 E2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980); Computer People, Inc. v.
Computer Dimensions Int'l, 638 F. Supp. 1293 (M.D. La. 1986).
203. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988); Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758 (5th
Cir. 1994).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994). See also supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1994).
1997]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW RE VIEW [VOL. 17:227
Once the federal court remands the case to state court, it is divested of jurisdic-
tion. A remand order is final once a certified copy of the order is forwarded to the
clerk of the state court.2 6 This creates a curious anamoly in that the parties may
believe that federal jurisdiction has been divested, while the federal court, in reali-
ty, still has jurisdiction. Thus, the astute practitioner desiring reconsideration of
the remand order will check to see whether the certified copy has been sent and, if
not, file a motion for reconsideration promptly. If the certified copy has been
207sent, however, reconsideration of the remand order may not be granted.
V APPELLATE OVERVIEW OF EXCURSIONS BETWEEN THE COURTS
The ability to file for reconsideration is important because appellate review of
orders denying or granting remand is severely limited. Orders denying remand
are interlocutory in nature and, thus, are not reviewable except as part of an
appeal from final judgment. 0 8 Immediate appellate review may be sought only
as part of an appeal from another appealable order or by writ of mandamus. The
former might occur, for instance, in conjunction with immediate review of the• - 209
grant or denial of an injunction. The latter, however, will rarely occur. Writs
of mandamus are reserved for "extreme situations" and are rarely granted by the
courts. 21° Of course, a party desiring review of a remand denial may request cer-
tification of the ruling for interlocutory review, but, even then, review rests in the
211discretion of the appellate court.
Section 1447(d) expressly provided that "[a]n order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or. • ,,212
otherwise. This ban is limited to remands based on the two grounds enumer-
ated in § 1447(c), 213 that is, if the remand is based on a timely-raised procedural
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994). See Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 1995);
Seedman v. United States Dist. Court, 837 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1988); Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1078
(5th Cir. 1984). See also State v. Sprint Communications Co., 899 F. Supp. 282, 284 (M.D. La. 1995) (when
mailing of certified copy "slips through the cracks," court retains jurisdiction to reconsider remand ruling).
207. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Majorie, 802 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1986). Contra In re Carter, 618
F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing review of remand order after final judgment).
208. See Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 99 F.3d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1996) (reviewing denial
of remand as part of review of final judgment).
209. See, e.g., Spring Garden Assoc. v. RTC, 26 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 1994); Jones v. Newton, 775 E2d 1316 (5th
Cir. 1985).
210. See Rohrer Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v. Perkins, 728 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1984). But see In re Allstate Ins.
Co., 8 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting mandamus should be granted if remand was granted on grounds
not permitted under § 1446(c)).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994). In fact, the party would be wise to request certification to preserve the
issue for appeal of final judgment. Courts have upheld final judgments, despite erroneous denials of motions
to remand, provided subject matter jurisdiction existed over the case at the time of trial. See, e.g., Grubbs v.
General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1971); Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 26 E3d 930 (9th
Cir. 1994); O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Gould v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 790 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986); Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Costa Lines Cargo Serv., 903 F.2d 352 (5th
Cir. 1990). The request for certification presumably would preserve defects in removal procedure for appellate
review. See, e.g., Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach Assoc., 903 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1990). Cf Kruse v. State, 68
E3d 331 (9th Cir. 1995) (The Grubbs rule is limited to decisions on the merits. If a court otherwise disposes of
the case, procedural defects may be reviewed.).
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994).
213. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 116 S. Ct. 494, 497 (1995) ("section 1447(d) must be read in
part materia with section 1447(c)"). See also In re Abbott Labs., 51 F3d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1995).
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214 215error or any jurisdictional error, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear
216the case. If, however, the remand is based on a ground not enumerated in §
217
1447(c), the appellate court may review the propriety of the remand . Morever,
in the case of a district court's discretionary remand of supplemental state law
claims, the appellate court may exercise its jurisdiction. In such a case, remand
is based on the court's discretionary power, not the procedural or jurisdictional
218defects of § 1447(c). Finally, orders granting remand may be reviewed in con-
junction with other final and appealable orders. Thus, where the district court
dismisses certain claims and remands the remaining nonfederal ones, the remand
219may be reviewed by the appellate court.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, many considerations enter into the removal and remand of cases
between state and federal courts. Parties on the road to federal court must ensure
that they abide by the minuscule rules governing the type of removal sought or
214. See In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an order granting a motion to
remand based on alleged procedural defect, which motion was filed after the thirty day period for filing a
remand motion, was not within the scope of § 1447(c), and thus was reviewable).
215. See, e.g., Things Remembered, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 497 (untimely removal notice unreviewable); Bogle v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1994) (erroneous finding of no preemption unreviewable);
Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Thompson, 987 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1993) (removal of statutorily unremovable
claim not reviewable); Whitman v. Raley's, Inc., 886 E2d 1177 (9th Cit. 1989) (erroneous finding of complete
preemption unreviewable).
216. One Fifth Circuit decision, In re Digicon Marine, Inc., 966 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1992), has suggested that
remand orders are only unreviewable pursuant to § 1447(d) if based on a finding of lack of subject matter juris-
diction. Because the Fifth Circuit follows the broader definition of procedural error, see Baris v. Sulpicio Lines
Inc. 932 F.2d 1540 (5th Cir. 1991), more remand orders would be reviewable under this precedent than in most
circuits. For instance, the Fifth Circuit treats lack of removal jurisdiction as a procedural error, thus allowing
appellate review of that error. Id. However, later Fifth Circuit cases have followed the general rule that remand
orders based on both procedural and jurisdictional errors are unreviewable pursuant to § 1447(d). See Eustus v.
Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 E3d 100 (5th Cit. 1996); In re Medscope Marine, Ltd., 972 F2d 107 (5th Cit.
1992). Given the adherence of all other circuits to this rule, it would appear to be the better one. See generally
Charles Everingham, IV, Removal, Waiver, and the Myth of Unreviewable Remand in the Fifth Circuit, 45
BAYLOR L. REv. 723 (1993) (explaining the correctness of the Medscope decision and recounting generally
Fifth Circuit rules regarding appellate review of remand orders).
217. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), holding that § 1447(d) only prohibits
appellate review of remand orders issued pursuant to § 1447(c). Thus, if the court remanded because its docket
was too crowded, for instance, the remand would be reviewable by the appellate court. Id. See also note 200
and accompanying text (citing other examples of remands not based on the statutory grounds of § 1447(c)).
See also Minot v. Eckhardt-Minot, 13 E3d 590 (2d Cir. 1994) (remand based on abstention); In re International
Paper Co., 961 E2d 558 (5th Cit. 1992) (remand in the "spirit of federalism"); Clorox v. United States Dist. Ct.,
779 F.2d 517 (9th Cit. 1985) (remand based on waiver of removal right); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco
Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 E2d 273 (9th Cit. 1984) (remand based on forum selection clause). For an excellent
account of the various circuits' treatment of the Thermtron exception, see Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking
Review of Remands: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83 (1994).
218. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas Children's Hosp., 84 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1996) (discretionary remand pursuant to
§ 1367); Executive Software of N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994) (same);
Bogle, 24 E3d at 758 (same); Eustus, 97 F.3d at 103-04 (discretionary remand pursuant to § 1441(c)); In re
Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1255 (11 th Cit. 1992) (same).
219. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996). See, e.g., Eustus, 97 E3d at 103-04 (order
finding FMLA claim removable, but remanding state law claims); Loftin v. Rush, 767 F.2d 800 (1 lth Cir. 1985)
(order vacating state court judgment and remanding claims to state court); In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.
1985) (order denying summary judgment to defendant in bankruptcy debtor's tort action and remanding to state
court); Pelleport Investors, Inc v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 E2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984) (remand order
based on forum selection agreement). See also Bennett v. Liberty Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 968 E2d 969 (9th Cit.
1992) (order upholding arbitration agreement but remanding action to state court); Wasserman, supra note 217.
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risk remand of their case back to the state court. By contrast, parties seeking
remand to state court must pay particular attention to the nature of the removal
error and the timing of their remand application. Even if a district court's deci-
sion to remand or not to remand a case is in error, the appellate court may lack
jurisdiction to take corrective action. In this regard, a party's failure to follow the
appropriate removal or remand procedures may have lasting effects. The effect
may even be a permanent one, as when subject matter jurisdiction existed at the
time of trial, the federal appellate court may treat any procedural defect as a sort
of harmless error and affirm the federal district court's decision, anyway. Thus,
because the rules of removal and remand dictate the very court that will hear a
party's case, the party seeking removal or remand would be wise to check, dou-
ble-check, and triple-check its actions when moving to remove or remand its case
between the courts.
